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BOOK REVIEWS
DEATH PENALTIES:

THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE.

By

Raoul Berger. Littleton, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp.
242. $17.50.
This book is not about the agonizing political and moral problem
of whether or not death at the hands of government is justifiable as punishment. The entire contemporary debate about deterrence and desert
is absent from these pages. Instead, Raoul Berger's thesis is that "control of death penalties and of the sentencing process . . . was left by the
Constitution to the States" (p. 9). Death Penalties is a defense of an extreme states' rights position-not just in imposing the death penalty, but
in many other matters such as state-mandated racial segregation (e.g.,
pp. 24, 184-85) and state-run sectarian schools (p. 108).
The principle of complete state sovereignty over punishment for
acts made criminal by state law, together with an extremely narrow interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, leads Berger
to the position that the United States Supreme Court has no power to
prevent the government from punishing by branding, mutilation, and
whipping (p. 113), nor from imposing death for the crime of forgery of
public securities (p. 47), or for piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
and sodomy (p. 44). Berger seems unclear whether the eighth amendment would permit the government to impose disembowelling for treason (pp. 40-41).' "At issue is not whether a man may be hanged for
stealing a loaf of bread, but whether the Court is authorized to take that
decision away from the legislature and the people" (p. 128).
How does Berger defend this position? While two chapters deal
with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,2 most of Death Penalties reiterates his general constitutional theory, which he has urged in
previous works.3 In my view his theory has been effectively discredited
I Compare 40 n.52 ("If it did not violate the 1689 clause [as he argues disembowelling for
treason did not], it did not violate the Eighth Amendment") with pp. 42-43 ("Whether there
was in fact no 'causal connection between the "Bloody Assize" and the cruel and unusual
punishments clause' is of no moment if the Founders thought there was").
2 Chapter 3 considers the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and
Chapter 6 considers the Supreme Court's death penalty cases.
3 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
1115
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among contemporary scholars in constitutional law, 4 and it will not be
discussed here in great detail. This review will instead set forth the argument structure of the book insofar as it relates to imposition of the
death penalty and discuss its underlying theory sufficiently to explain
why the argument rests on a deeply flawed, and at bottom an incoherent, theory of constitutional government. The review will briefly consider Berger's treatment of eighth amendment case law, and finally,
comment on the book's character and tone.
Berger does not set forth his argument systematically. Nonetheless,
it can be fairly reconstructed as follows:
A. Whatever the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
eighth amendment means, it does not limit state governments at all,
since the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states. This is because (1)
the Bill of Rights and hence the eighth amendment did not apply to the
states in 1789 and (2) the fourteenth amendment in 1866 did nothing to
change that situation-its requirements that state legislation stay within
the bounds of due process and equal protection of the laws have no effect on state punishment or sentencing practices. Why not? Because the
Framers of the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment so intended.
B. In any case, assuming arguendo that the eighth amendment limits state governments as well as the federal government, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause does not prohibit executions for any crime
punishable by death in England and/or the American colonies in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Shameful and degrading punishments (p. 118 n.29, p. 127); excessive and disproportionate punishments
(p. 34 n.28, p. 148), punishments that violate human dignity (pp. 11720), and punishments administered discriminatorily on the basis of race
or class (pp. 55-58; pp. 42-43) are all excluded from its scope. Why?
Because the Framers of the Constitution so intended.
What is apparent from this skeletal reconstruction of Berger's argument is that its backbone must be a theory of constitutional government
that equates the authoritative meaning of Constitutional words and provisions with the intention of the Framers. Berger is indeed a thoroughgoing intentionalist or originalist in constitutional interpretation, yet
Berger does not argue explicitly for such a constitutional theory. Apparently he regards its validity as self-evident. To the question, "Why
should the words in the Constitution mean only what the Framers intended them to mean?" Berger would think it sufficient to answer, "Because that's what the Framers intended."
4 See, e.g., Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Nonative
ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); cf. Tushnet, Following the Rule Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivismand Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1983).
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This pelitio principii is not a satisfying theory of constitutional government. One obvious rival interpretivist theory is textualism: the
words mean what the words mean (the plain meaning rule). An
originalist species of textualism is possible (the words mean what they
meant in 1789); insofar as Berger sometimes seems to embrace textualism, this is the species he embraces. But another species of textualism
would not see meaning as primarily historical at all. Under that kind of
textualism, in order to determine whether something is a cruel punishment, we look into what "cruel" means. Thus, semantics and perhaps
ethics become more important than historical psychology. In any case,
in order to choose one of these interpretive theories of constitutional
government, or some non-interpretive theory, a normative political theory is necessary. Berger lacks such a theory.
Perhaps Berger thinks that his brand of interpretivism is not a
political theory at all, but rather an historical "fact." He derides scholars who argue on the basis of philosophical or political theories. Yet
most of the sophisticated participants in the constitutionalism debate
have realized that even appeals to historical fact require theory; our historical and interpretive theories determine what we consider to be historical facts and what political significance we attribute to them.
Not only does Berger fail to argue for his constitutional theory, he
likewise ignores the many ambiguities and philosophical difficulties of
5
using the Framers' intent as a criterion for authoritative meaning.
Sometimes he writes as if intent means the actual private thoughts of the
individual members of the Constitutional convention, or of the colonists
in general; sometimes he writes as if the Framers' intent is to be equated
with judicial practice, or legislative practice, or common social practice
in England or the colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
He does not seem to be aware that all these "intents" may be different.
He argues simultaneously that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause means what it meant in 1689 when enacted in the English Bill of
Rights (pp. 40-43, esp. n.52); means whatever the Founders or the colonists thought it meant, even if they were mistaken about its meaning in
the common law (pp. 43-44); and that the word "unusual" in the clause
is to be given its ordinary everyday meaning (p. 41). The latter is not
even an intentionalist argument, but rather the originalist version of textualism, since Berger suggests that the clause prohibits only punishments
5 The difficulties with interpretive theories based on legislative intent are incisively and
systematically set forth in Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CA.. L. REV. 151, esp. 265-69
(198 1);seegenerally id. at 246-70. What does it mean to speak of a group's intent? Who counts
as part of the group? What if the individual members have different ideas of meaning or
imagined results? What constitutes evidence of the group's intent?
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that were unusual (in this ordinary sense) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Thus, Berger is hampered by unexamined and impoverished views
of political theory and semantics. He is no less hampered by an unexamined and impoverished view of ethics. His view of value judgments
seems to be that of a radical skeptic: there is no such thing as right or
wrong, only individual subjective preferences. For him there is only a
stark dichotomy: either the Justices implement the "will" or "predilections" of the Framers, or their own "will" or "predilections."' 6 There is
no room here for viewing the Court's efforts as good faith attempts to
implement ethical principles implied by the text. There is no room for
the common sense idea that perhaps we should interpret the word
"cruel" in the Constitution by finding out what really is cruel (ile., by
applying our best ethical theories of what is cruel). It is no wonder that
Berger does not consider the marriage of textualism and intentionalism
possible under Ronald Dworkin's concept/conception analysis. 7 Applying Dworkin's analysis to the eighth amendment suggests that the Framers "intended" future generations to be bound by the concept of cruelty,
but not necessarily by the particular conception of cruelty then
prevalent.
Other than to repeat the petitioprincipi"that Berger must think establishes his brand of intentionalism as the theory of constitutional government, Berger might make three replies to what has been said here.
He might say: (1) Under any plausible theory of constitutional interpetation, the Constitution leaves to the states total sovereignty over
the death penalty in state criminal law; (2) if we don't want the Constitution to do this, we should amend it; and (3) under any theory of the
meaning of the clause, the death penalty is not cruel because it was commonly used until fairly recently. Berger doesn't really argue for the first
reply, since he is so sure his theory is the theory, but clearly the proposition is false. There are plausible theories for applying the fundamental
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to limit state government actions against
individuals. Still less does he argue for the third, but clearly there are
plausible theories under which the meaning of "cruel" in the Constitution is not exhausted by the accepted cruelties of the eighteenth century,
6 Berger's obvious belief that his brand of intentionalism is the right theory of constitutional government no matter how much judges and others act contrary to it is inconsistent
with his implicit belief that all value judgments reflect merely subjective preferences. The
inconsistency might be made to disappear if no value judgment is necessary to decide what is
the right theory of constitutional government. Thus, if one believes that the right theory is
"simply" a "fact," or accepts the legal positivist cleavage of law and ethics, one might cling
both to the radical subjectivity of values and constitutional objectivity of the kind sought by
Berger.
7 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136-37 (1977).
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or even (if one is a realist in ethics8) by the accepted cruelties of today.
As in his other works, Berger dwells on the second proposition
(change must be by constitutional amendment) throughout Death Penalties. The proposition reflects a perennial problem in democratic government with separation of powers: what is the proper role of courts in our
ongoing process of social and ideological development? The problem
has generated an ongoing debate of great complexity in law and political theory. No hard-and-fast answers have emerged, and perhaps the
nature of the problem is that they cannot, but it is pretty clear that
naive legal realism (the law is whatever the Court says it is) and naive
legal positivism (the radical separation of "making" law from "applying" law) are both inadequate theories of what our institutions are and
ought to be.
Berger contributes nothing to the discussion of this central problem
of democratic government. In fact, because of the ambiguities in his
brand of intentionalism, one cannot even tell what kinds of things he
thinks would require constitutional amendment to make them permissible judicial domain. He seems to think that what is prohibited by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is limited to the list of known
cruelties in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; yet, he states that
"[o]f course the Fourth Amendment 'search and seizure' principle, for
example, goes beyond physical searches to comprehend current wiretaps
and electronic surveillance. They are analogous to what was prohibited
• . . " (p. 73). Furthermore, Berger obviously believes that there is a
bright line separating the extension of one principle by analogy and the
application of a different principle. Here he mistakes quicksand for terra
firma. Beneath the false distinction between analogies and new principles lies a philosophical problem of great complexity. It seems obvious
that where one principle leaves off and another begins depends upon
what level of generality is chosen for the principles, from among the
infinite points on the continuum from the very specific to very general.
Why does the fourth amendment, with its reference to persons, papers,
houses and effects, not imply only the narrow principle of "no unreasonable intrusions upon bodily integrity, living space, or tangible private
objects by government agents in person?"
I turn now to what the reader may have supposed Death Penalties is
all about: the United States Supreme Court's death penalty cases. Berger is correct that the Court's jurisprudence of death 9 is in distressing
disarray. In 1971, the Court decided that unfettered jury discretion in
8 See Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. Rrv. 1061.
9 See Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death: Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
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death sentencing did not violate due process, 10 and in 1972 the Court
decided it did violate the eighth amendment. I I In 1976, a three-Justice
plurality prevailed in imposing the guided-discretion approach of the
Model Penal Code,' 2 because the two Justices who find the death penalty per se cruel aligned with the plurality when that alignment would
result in reversal of a death sentence. Some Justices, notably Justice
Rehnquist, would follow Berger's approach at least to some degree, and
dissent from both of the other approaches. Thus, there is no majority
position on how to deal with the death penalty, and there has not been
one for more than a decade.
Yet what follows from the Court's struggle? Berger correctly perceives that constitutionally required standards are inconsistent with constitutionally required discretion. But what follows froml the seeming
impossibility of reconciling the need for non-arbitrariness in sentencing
with the need for individual treatment? Berger thinks that what follows
is that the Court should give up and let each state do whatever it wants
in all aspects of death penalty imposition and administration. Others
think that what follows is that the death penalty cannot be retained at
3
all consistently with the rule of law.'
The 1978 Lockett case, which Berger correctly perceives as a return
in significant measure to the jury sentencing discretion condemned in
the 1972 Furman case (pp. 149-51), provides support for the latter argument. But Berger's discussion of Lockett is murky. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for the prevailing plurality deserves more attention than Berger
gives it. In Lockett, Burger recognized that the need for individualized
decisions and the need for minimizing the risk of imposition of death on
those who do not deserve it relate to the "respect due the uniqueness of
the individual,"' 4 and that for a state to execute someone without according such respect constitutes cruel punishment. The impossibility of
achieving both the required consistency and the required non-arbitrariness may therefore mean that imposition of the death penalty disrespects individuals and hence violates the eighth amendment.
10 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
11 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
13 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); cf. C.
BLACK,CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respectfor Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S.C.L. REV. 1143
(1980). The "dilemma of discretion" is that we cannot simultaneously obtain the required
individuation to render just deserts to each person and maintain the required consistency to
make the punishments non-arbitrary.
14 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, C.J., separate opinion).
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Finally, a few remarks on the tone and character of Death Penalties
are necessary. First, it is unfortunate that Berger's book is marred by
constant snide remarks about those who disagree with him, some of
which are merely annoying asides or epithets, and some of which are
distracting excrescenses. In the former category, for example, are his
references to Justice Brennan (p. 95) and Arthur S. Miller (p. 195) as
"perfervid activists" or his reference to John Hart Ely as the "worshipful
disciple" of Chief Justice Warren (p. 53). In the latter category are his
frequent pauses to argue with critics of the positions he took in his earlier works such as the nonapplicability of the fourteenth amendment to
state-mandated racial segregation and the illegitimacy of the one-person-one-vote principle, among others.
Second, the use Berger makes of the many interesting quotations he
has gathered from his broad reading of Supreme Court cases should be
taken with a grain of salt. For example, Berger states (p. 16 n.27) that
Justice White "regards the concept of 'ordered liberty' as merely a
means whereby a majority of the Court can impose 'its own philosophy
and predilections /sic (misquote)] upon State legislatures or Congress,' "
inaccurately quoting White's dissenting opinion in Robinson v. California .15 In that passage, White did not say that the very concept of ordered liberty is a sham. He said:
I deem this application of 'cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that I
suspect the Court was hard put to find a way to ascribe to the Framers of
the Constitution the result reached today rather than to its own notions of
ordered liberty. If this case involved economic regulation, the present
Court's allergy to substantive due process would surely save the statute and
prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophicalpredilections upon state
legislatures or Congress.16
Though White here objected to the majority's "own notions" of ordered
liberty, in his opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana 17, he made
clear that some scheme of ordered liberty is to be considered "fundamental" in the Anglo-American system of justice. Moreover, he made clear
that a finding by the Court that a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights belonging to that fundamental Anglo-American scheme of ordered liberty justifies the application of that provision to bind the states
as well as the federal government. Thus, Berger certainly misleads the
reader by saying, on the basis of White's statement that the Court was
imposing "its own notions" of the concept of ordered liberty in a 1962
case, that White "regards" the entire "concept" of ordered liberty as
"merely a means" to impose the will of the Justices.
15 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962).
16 Id at 689 (emphasis added).
17

391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
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In sum, Death Penalties is ill-organized and repetitive, shows signs of
haste, and rehashes much of Berger's earlier work. It adds nothing to the
study of eighth amendment case law, nothing to the debate about the
underlying justification of the death penalty, and little to the history of
the inclusion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the Bill
of Rights. So one is finally moved to ask why it was written. Who did
Berger want or expect to read it?
Perhaps Death Penalties is aimed to some extent at the Supreme
Court Justices, although in that case someone should tell Berger that he
might catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. More clearly, the
book is aimed at Congress. In Chapter 7, Berger urges that the remedy
for the mess the Supreme Court has made of the death penalty is for
Congress to withdraw the Court's jurisdiction over these cases. The
book is thus a political tract, and that explains a great deal about its
structure and tone. Those who seek debater's points may find something useful in these pages. Those who seek knowledge or enlightenment should seek elsewhere.
MARGARET JANE RADIN
PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW CENTER

By Laszlo Viski. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982. Pp. 171. $19.50 (cloth).

ROAD TRAFFIC OFFENDERS AND CRIME POLICY.

This book is a revised version of the author's original Hungarian
edition, completed and published after his death by Arpad Erdei. The
central focus of the book is the question of whether the criminal law is
the appropriate means for responding to violations of traffic regulations.
Viski argues that the mass application of the criminal law to traffic offenders leads to a reversal of the traditional ideas of rule and exception.
He theorizes that traffic offenses involve a special situation brought
about by the relationship between the psychological nature of the driver
and the technological nature of the automobile. The driver is bombarded by any number of demands: environmental stimuli, density of
traffic, road conditions, and so forth. Thus, the driving public realizes
that there is no longer the traditional "us versus them" relationship
which would normally distinguish the "good" citizen from the "criminal." In this situation, anyone can be a criminal, since driving is virtually a universal behavior, and traffic violations are commonplace.
Traffic law must not become overly broad, therefore, extending to tech-
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nical advances that leave one with little or no chance of avoiding certain
rule infractions.
Viski, supported by the bulk of the relevant literature, concludes
that the traffic offender is not really a criminal in the classic sense.
There is still justification, however, for applying sanctions to persons
who violate the traffic laws. Many accidents are caused by people who
habitually break traffic rules; such accidents do not result from chance,
but are the product of a pattern of behavior. Sanctions contribute to
the creation of customs which, in turn, eventually become norms. Thus,
punishment is important because it serves to "develop a readiness to
follow the norms" (p. 56). Other aims of punishment include special
prevention, general prevention, and retribution. Viski places little faith
in the general prevention function because of the routine use of the automobile by the masses, technological demands, and the limited likelihood of identification and apprehension. The other two aims, he feels,
are more attainable: special prevention, because punishment is directed
toward an individual already identified and apprehended, and retribution, because of the need to "repair the damage to the legal order" (p.
95).
Viski's next step is to determine which punishments should be applied to which violations. The sanction with the "gravest and most defamatory legal consequences" (p. 10 1) is, of course, loss of freedom. This
punishment is appropriate for violations causing serious results: fatality,
grave bodily injury, mass injury, and substantial material loss. For less
serious offenses, however, even short term loss of freedom (less than one
month) should not be used "owing to its harmful effects" (p. 104). The
fine, even though it hits the poor man harder than the wealthy, is the
most appropriate punishment for the majority of traffic offenders. Other
sanctions could include disqualification from driving, but only as a supplementary, and not primary, punishment. Finally, Viski voices strong
support for the use of official warnings for minor offenses and compulsory medical treatment for persons found to be insane or intoxicated.
Having concluded that traffic offenders are not really criminals, yet
are deserving of punishment, Viski moves to the question of how to
identify the violators who should be punished. The small percentage of
drivers who cause a large percentage of accidents are characterized by
low intelligence, antisocial and aggressive personality, poor attitude toward work, and "immature psyche" (p. 147). Still, Viski believes that
the research is too inconclusive for us to rely upon personality as the
distinguishing factor when determining the proper form of punishment.
A better approach is to weigh factors which can be objectively measured, such as degree of harm done and recidivism. The combination of
these factors would then determine the proper level of punishment for
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each violator. For instance, "[d]runken driving with no harmful result,
when committed for the first time does not call for loss of freedom punishment. On the other hand, the law should provide for loss of freedom
punishment irrespective of the result if the drunken driver is a special
recidivist" (p. 161).
Viski concludes that traffic offenders should be dealt with by means
of a traffic criminal law which would be separate from, but similar to,
the regular criminal law. This would end the confusion caused by trying to determine which traffic offenses are criminal and which are not.
Thus, "[t]he term 'traffic criminal law' in this case would mean the body
of law sanctioning traffic violations and consolidated into a unity by the
common subject of law" (p. 164).
Although this is a relatively short book, it is anything but short in
terms of philosophical argument. Viski is completely thorough in his
examination of automobile driving, use of sanctions to influence behavior, types of sanctions, and sanctions appropriate to traffic rule violations. He begins with the general and painstakingly moves to the
specific. Citing such a volume of literature that he at times almost overwhelms the reader, the author goes to great lengths to provide complete
supporting evidence for every line of reasoning and each conclusion.
Sometimes it is difficult however, to separate Viski's thoughts from those
of the scholars being quoted.
Of course, the product of such a laborious effort is a well-documented, articulate, and elaborate argument leading to a conclusion that
defies attack. On the other hand, the reader who lacks a background in
the subject matter is apt to miss much of this argument and never reach
the conclusion. Fortunately, Viski provides a ten page summary which
draws together the main points of his thesis and spells out the key recommendations in terms unhindered by philosophical rhetoric. The final
statements are so clear and concise that one is left wondering if the previous 160 pages amount to "much ado about nothing."
Another problem with the book is its verbose and stilted text. The
language is often difficult to follow, as though something has truly been
lost in the translation. For example:
In Hebenstreit's opinion, the 'reliability' of the driver is the most important factor. This reliability is present when the vehicle driver is capable of
dominating the endothymous modes of life actualized by driving, above all
overcoming tendencies towards over-estimation or uncriticalness arising
from the utilization of mechanized force (p. 44).
An excellent observation, no doubt, but surely there is a better way to
express the same thought.
A final distraction is the heavy reliance upon Hungarian law and
Eastern European research to illustrate the various points. However, it
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must be remembered that this is a translation of a book written for a
specific audience, which justifiably utilizes information which that audience would understand. This is to say that Road Traffic Ofenders and Cime
Policy will not likely find its way to the average living room coffee table
or the average professor's bookshelf. The book is perhaps best suited to
the student of comparative law, or to a scholar with a special interest in
traffic offenses. Otherwise, the narrow scope of this work will limit its
readership to only the most diligent or the most curious.
DR.

ROBERT

G.

HUCKABEE

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL WORK, AND SOCIOLOGY
NORTHEAST LOUISIANA UNIVERSITY

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

ETHICAL ISSUES FOR THE

80's. Edited by Frank Schmalleger and Robert Gustafson. Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1981. Pp. vi, 321. $20.75
(cloth), $11.75 (paper).
The central goal of the editors in presenting this collection of articles, to apply American (or Western) societal values to the criminal justice and corrections systems, seems naive and impossible of realization.
Fortunately, some of the individual articles in the collection present a
more realistic view.
The editors are academicians; Schmalleger is a sociologist with interests in criminology and criminal justice and Gustafson is a philosopher with religious concerns. They have jointly written a short preface,
the first editor an introduction, and the second editor the.last two articles in the collection; the latter of these is a summarizing conclusion. Of
the remaining nine articles, six are written by academicians (including
sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and difficult-to-identify
others) and three are written by practitioners.
The editors' preface cites a need for improved ethical awareness
and calls for an infusion of American ideals of justice and fairness into
the "mechanistic" American justice system. Schmalleger's introduction
continues this strong idealistic flavor by defining what justice and ethics
would be under a reformed justice system, bemoaning the current sacrifice of ideals to technological efficiency, and using these ideals as standpoints from which to summarize the remaining articles of the collection.
A similar set of ideals, offered as seven norms, is presented in the second
to the last article, by Gustafson. These ideals, consistent with those of
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Kant and other moralists, form an ethical system for both society as a
whole and the criminal justice system. In contrast is the concluding article of the collection, also by Gustafson, where he summarizes and realistically evaluates the feasibility of implementing the views expressed in
the articles preceding his own.
Perhaps the sense of naivet6, unreality, and idealism in much of this
collection is encouraged and buttressed by the vagueness inherent in the
study of values and ethics generally. A second problem is created by the
difficulty of delineating the values of American society and Western civilization, and then translating these values into justice and fairness relevant to the worlds of crime and corrections. A third problem is the
implicit belief, evident throughout the collection, that crime can be severely reduced or, in principle, even eradicated. Those who believe this
2
could profit from the outlooks of Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton
that a certain degree of crime and deviance is normal and functional for
society. Relevant in another way is the view of George Vold 3 that
crime, morality, and justice are defined and enforced by the dominant
groups of a community or society.
The article by John P. Matthews and Ralph 0. Marshall exhibits
this high idealism in that it calls for criminal justice organizations,
which are usually primarily concerned with their own organizational
needs, to focus more on service to clients. This is to be accomplished by
rewarding the "problem solvers"- those police, parole officers, prosecutors, and judges who act ethically by taking risks in relation to their
clients. Paul Murphy and T. Kenneth Moran are even more unrealistic, anticipating a New York City police scandal before the end of this
century and calling for redoubling efforts to eradicate the "cancers" of
corruption, skepticism, cynicism, secrecy, and anomie in all police departments. This is to be done through educating and motivating police
officers to follow the Code of Ethics of the American Academy for Professional Law Enforcement. Both articles demonstrate an insufficient
appreciation of social structure, the former through hoping to change
organizational priorities, the latter by an expectation of changing individual attitudes and overcoming the already existing and spontaneous
group solidarity that is further reinforced by continuing external threat.
A mixture of realism and naivete is found in John Jay Douglass'
treatment of prosecutorial ethics, in Carolynne H. Stevens' call for ethical restructuring of corrections, and in the focus on prison ethics auI

E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 65-74 (S. Solovay

&J. Mueller

trans., G. Catlin ed. 1938).
2 R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE ch. I, IV (1949); R. MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE ch. III, IV, VII (enlarged 3d ed. 1968).
3 G. VOLD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY ch. XI - XIII (1958).
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thored by David B. Miller, Mostafa M. Noury, and Joseph J. Tobia.
Douglass, in a long and thorough article, rightly points to the continuing temptation for prosecutors to use unethical methods even for good
reasons, to the conflict between fair trial and freedom of the press, and
to problems especially characteristic of the situation faced by part-time
prosecutors-conflicts of interest, low salaries, and moonlighting. While
he neither advocates nor expects strict adherence to relevant American
Bar Association codes, Douglass naively falls back in reliance on a strong
personal code of conduct for prosecutors; perhaps there is no other feasible alternative.
Stevens, with psychological training and a career in corrections and
welfare administration, decries both the criminal justice system's adversarial depiction of "offenders" as enemies and the public's hypocritical
and simplistic vacillation between pro-punishment and pro-correction
views. Believing international interdependence and universal humanity
to require a pan-ethical, rather than a conflict, model, she proposes a
slow step-by-step, painful but innovative process through which practitioners and public alike can develop such a model. Throughout, Stevens seems to believe that problems can be solved, or at least managed,
by reinforcing appropriate behaviors.
A problem related to those presented by Douglass and Stevens is
discussed in Miller, Noury, and Tobia's article recommending decentralized community programs (such as halfway houses or intensive treatment projects) as intermediate measures between probation and parole,
on the one hand, and prison confinement, on the other; prisons as "total
institutions" with "contraculture" "we-group" subcultures frustrate rehabilitation within any conceivable societal system of ethics. As with
some of the other articles, the authors resort to community programs as
a desperate hope. They make good use of ideas from Erving Goffman,
Milton Yinger, and William Graham Sumner but could benefit from a
Vold intergroup conflict perspective, as could Douglass and Stevens.
More akin to a Voldian perspective, and in line with the MillerNoury-Tobia emphasis on prison contracultures, is the contribution of
sociologist Ralph 0. Marshall. He advises parole boards to take into
account the criminal's "counter-culture" (and counter-ethic), as well as
society's values, and then to use a utilitarian approach considering
which parolees are likely to do the greatest good for, or least harm to,
society. An equally pragmatic approach is presented by Lawrence Bennett, psychologist and Program Evaluation Director, National Institute
of Justice, who proposes judging evaluation research in terms of its consequences, actual or anticipated, for human values. He develops a
number of ethically informed principles that should make researchers
aware of the multiple ethical implications of all phases of their research,
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ranging from problem and sample selection to post-research policy, as
well as practical suggestions for decisionmakers.
The two articles with an international concern reflect the variation
in the rest of this collection. Andr6 Bossard, secretary general of Interpol, recognizes the complexities and problem involved in developing
an international code of ethics for crime investigation. His approach
seems apt in that it stresses respect for national laws, sets some limits for
all police systems (such as excluding offenses that are primarily political,
military, religious, or racial in character), and encourages police to act
in a socially (i.e., culturally) acceptable manner. But his approach is not
very cross-cultural or universal insofar as he recommends that 127 national police systems should balance individual rights and freedoms, on
the one hand, with societal requisites and order, on the other; nor insofar as he expects police to obey the law "in every respect," to avoid
"corruption," and to be impartial.
Charles L. Johnson, a political scientist, and Gary D. Copus, a sociologist, attempt to apply Merton's "anomie" modes of adaptation, and
(with more success) Leon Festinger's "cognitive dissonance" theory, to
the gulf between the international police code of ethics ("idealistic" and
largely ignored) and police "attitudes/assumptions" that reflect their actual occupational experience (their "real" environment or subculture).
Consistent with Festinger's approach is a proposed middle-ground solution of modifying the code of ethics in the direction of legitimate police
concerns, so that observance of the modified code by police is cognitively
consonant with their occupational reality.
It is easy to criticize this collection by asking how the article authors were chosen, how much they were told about the purpose of this
collection, why their names are not listed with their article titles on the
"Contents" page, why their disciplinary areas are often not supplied,
why there is no index, and why two summaries of the articles were
needed. Poor typesetting and inadequate proofreading also indicate
that the collection was put together carelessly.
Gratifyingly, some practical proposals for dealing with ethical issues in criminal justice and corrections are offered by this collection.
However, there is much here that is impractical, naive, and ill-informed
from a social science perspective. Many of the articles, by practitioners
and academicians alike, tend too much toward philosophic and moralistic exhortation and catharsis. This collection may prove useful for college classes in criminal justice, criminology, corrections, and perhaps
ethics, and to practitioners in those areas, but only where tempered by
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some knowledge and appreciation of cultural heterogeneity and of social
power and conflict.
LEON H. WARSHAY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

By Jon R. Waltz.
Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1983. Pp. xvi, 454. $26.95.

INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2D ED.).

Jon R. Waltz, law professor and author of numerous books and
materials on evidence, has written for those in law enforcement a very
readable second edition of CriminalEvidence. Evidence may be viewed as
a procedure-related course of do's and dont's, a body of prohibitions, or
rules for communicating a mass of data in a courtroom.
Jurisprudence professors love evidence. Earl Stanley Gardner was
first an evidence professor before the case-scripts went public. The author of the "case method" (the use of appellate decisions to teach law),
Dean Thayor of Harvard Law School, was an evidence teacher. The
subject has been taught in various ways: using only a treatise; using a
casebook; through the problem method; through real trial scenarios; using video tapes, or using stand-up actors. The subject is vast and complex: it merges law as substance with law as procedure, joining rules
with process and trial histrionics with a quest for the truth.
Only Waltz and Imivinkelried have attempted short works on criminal evidence, and both works contain early admonitions that they are
intended primarily for layman. Indeed, in his preface, Waltz quotes an
exasperated Prime Minister Balfour, who silenced his critics by shouting, "I am talking English, not law."
With that caveat in mind, Criminal Evidence has much to recommend it. It covers most areas of evidence, uses primarily criminal illustrations, and laces the rules with refreshing dialogue and scenarios.
Over a hundred pages are devoted to an excellent introduction to scientific evidence in criminal cases. A useful bibliography is included as well.
The book, however, is not without its shortcomings. Despite Waltz'
disclaimer of the need for cant or jargon, some subjects such as "making
the record" and "objections" are covered in the book even though they
have no special relevance to non-lawyers.
Not content with discussing primary sources of law or an overly
long chapter on privileges, Waltz tackles the search and seizure areas in
sixty pages; this subject is an unreasonable pit far too vast and compli-
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cated for a book of this kind. On the other hand, Waltz' chapter on
identification and pretrial identification procedures is very useful and
practical. He should, however, have included a little something on pretrial discovery. Since most criminal cases are settled or compromised in
a plea of guilty, an evidence-related perspective on that process would
have been most useful.
For readers interested in a short evidence treatise addressed to evidentiary problems in criminal cases only, this book is probably about
the best available. What is needed (and missing), however, is one book
or many small ones addressed to the recurring evidence problems associated with specific criminal offenses, each of which has unique problems
endemic to that particular offense. Clearly the patterns of proffer, proof,
trial, and instruction in an armed robbery case are different from those
associated with a comparatively quaint moonshine or gambling case.
An effort should be made to relate trial anatomy, evidence problems,
and instruction on a strictly one-offense basis. The subject of presumptions, for instance, is unimportant in a battery case but may be critical
in a receiver or gun possession prosecution.
The courts' great mistake in the law of search and seizure was
caused by extending a single reason to varying situations, such as an
airport, auto, or a submarine, each having unique crime and search geography. This problem is replicated in the evidence area. The worst
offenders are most law schools, which squeeze into one curriculum offering-usually a three- or four-credit course marked simply "Evidence"the slip and fall evidentiary problems of civil actions and take a broad
brush swipe at the criminal area. Hopefully, the publication of books
such as Criminal Evidence will prompt in professional schools a new day
for an evidence course marked only "Criminal."
ROBERT EMMET BURNS
PROFESSOR OF LAW
DEPAUL UNIVERSITY

THE ETHICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS.

By Edward A. Malloy. Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1983. Pp. vii, 92. $16.75 (cloth), $6.75 (paper).
Edward A. Malloy of the Department of Theology at the University of Notre Dame provides four "bare bones" outline-form essays on
ethics. He examines two police issues-the use of force and corruption-and two corrections issues-imprisonment and capital punish-
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ment. Within this small volume-ninety-two pages including footnotes,
references, and cover pages-lie the beginnings of a true examination of
the application of ethics to the field of criminal justice.
In his first essay, Malloy almost succeeds in stating the issue about
police (and criminal justice) that is to be examined:
I remain convinced that the most serious deficiency at the present time is
the absence of a sustained and coherent "professional ethic"-a body of
knowledge with a clear assertion of the priority of certain values and the
presentation of workable principles and rules which protect these values in
practice. One of the reasons why the task of developing such an ethic is
imperative is that American police are given the kind ofjudgmental discretion in the lives of others that is normally reserved for the learned professions (p. 7).
What Malloy apparently means, but leaves unsaid, is that even the
few meager attempts made to structure police discretion have been
based on technical (e.g., caliber of pistol, type of nightstick) and legal
(e.g., fleeing felon, life in danger) grounds, with little thought given to
ethical or other moral considerations. For example, if a hierarchy of
moral values was established and a code of ethics drawn from it, would
police ever endanger the life of a property thief through the use of potentially deadly force? Would police endanger the lives of anyonepedestrians, other drivers, or the fleeing suspect-in a car chase? Without stating the issues clearly, Malloy does arrive at conclusions on these
and other points: for example, force is to be used only when the "common good" (whatever that is) is served and then only in proportion to
the force being counterbalanced; guns should be fired only to protect the
life of a police officer or someone else; the form and level of force should
always be based on the priority of persons over property; electronic surveillance by police should be carried on only with explicit court approval; torture is never justified; and interrogation must "maximize
consciousness of the rights of the accused" (p. 23).
The second offering, "An Ethical Perspective on Police Corruption," is quite different from the other three essays in that it provides a
review of the literature of typologies of police corruption while providing little "ethical" analysis. Malloy's suggested remedies-improve the
salary scale, eliminate unenforceable laws, improve police training and
cultivate a sense of professional responsibility, and form civilian review
boards to examine and prosecute charges of police misconduct-offer
nothing new in the way of advice or procedures. Above all, they offer
little in the way of the promised "ethical perspective." Again, discussion
or development of a code of ethics and axioms that would be pertinent
to such a code would have been welcomed.
In the corrections field, Malloy's approach is more effective as he
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incisively destroys the basic rationalizations for imprisonment-retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation-and declares that the only justifiable reason to take a person's freedom is the need for "special
deterrence" or "isolation;" and then imprisonment should be used "only
[for] those criminals who constitute a significant threat to the common
good by way of 'propensities for impulsive and predatory agression' " (p.
64). Malloy could have clarified his point by stating simply that deterrence and rehabilitation are dubious justifications for imprisonment,
both practically and ethically, while the retribution (i.e., "just deserts")
value is difficult to assess, and only incapacitation of the dangerous and
antisocial recidivist for the protection of society can be justified
ethically.
Regarding capital punishment, Malloy argues that while he does
not rule out the possibility of a situation in which the "common good"
would demand the death penalty, "[i]n the United States at the present
monent of history, there is no legitimate reason for invoking this power.
Even the danger associated with terrorism, assassination, and premeditated or mass murder is not a sufficient enough threat to warrant its use"
(p. 90). He also suggests that a "greater good" would be served by eliminating capital punishment.
As a theologian, Malloy is clearly more at home in the arena of
punishment than in the murky field of police standard operating procedures. Still, his overall knowledge of police practices is impressive despite minor flaws, such as his reference to "Sir George Peel" as the
founder of the London police department (p. 32).
With a suitable coauthor who had knowledge of the criminal justice system, and proper attention to development of an organizing principle as suggested above, Malloy could possibly have written a first text
or monograph for the burgeoning interest area of ethics in criminal justice. In this work, however, he has provided only some thought-provoking observations; for, while each item is highly structured in a formal
outline format, there is no unifying principle to tie the four essays together into a coherent whole based on a clearly stated ethical concept.
GENE STEPHENS, PH.D.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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Edited by Maurice Punch.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xvi, 346. $30.00.

CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANIZATION.

Control in the Police Organiation is an ironic title for a collection of
essays that dwell upon the absence of this quality in police organizations. Unencumbered by the recipe-like nature of the professional police
management literature, this potpourri of conceptual and empirical studies provides much-needed relief from the typical menu of prepackaged
Theories X, Y, etc., that benight the field. These essays affirm the dominant theme of the last decade's research, which discredited so many assumptions about what police can accomplish. The contributions,
separately and together, do not offer an integrated theory of police control, but they should serve the editor's purpose of stimulating further
research.
The volume contains fourteen essays culled from papers delivered
in a 1980 international seminar at Nijenrode, the Netherlands School of
Business. Half of the essays deal with police organizations outside the
United States, providing a distinct cross-national character to the
volume.
Egon Bittner's introductory essay distinguishes two criteria for control: legality and workmanship. Legality calls for compliance and operates through regulatory supervision; workmanship calls for mastery over
events occurring under uncertain conditions and operates through accountability. Bittner suggests that police lack systems for nurturing and
transmitting workmanship; this deficiency creates an overreliance on legal criteria and ultimately causes a degeneration of performance to the
point where officers merely attempt to keep their records trouble-free.
By implication, police accountability-the more demanding control
mechanism-can only be achieved when the agents of control are immersed in the context of the work itself. The uncertainty of the work
environment produces a you-had-to-be-there stance, or at least, a youhave-to-know-what-it's-like-to-be-there view. Most of the major empirical evaluations of police performance of the last decade-part of the
control process themselves-focused on the alleged accomplishments of
police workmanship (especially crime control), but they failed to make
an adequate accounting of the workmanship which was believed to produce those accomplishments. If researchers take Bittner's formulation of
accountability to heart, they must begin with painstaking scrutiny to
peer into the black boxes that transform inputs into outputs and outcomes. Some of the essays in this book begin to do just that.
Although all of the chapters show sensitivity to the immense complexity of controlling police, several make their principal contribution
by developing our appreciation of obstructions to control. Robert Rei-
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ner explores the recent efforts of British police to manipulate the political environment through pressure group activism, thus altering their
traditional nonpartisan image. A comparison of Reiner's case study of
Britain with political systems both more and less fragmented systems
(e.g., the United States and France) could provide a useful analysis of
the role of political structure in constraining police political activism.
This is the sort of research called for by David H. Bayley in his review of
the state of our ignorance of police. Peter Manning's comparison of the
communication systems of two police departments (American and British) responds to Bayley's summons. Manning explores the limits of technological gadgetry for controlling the incident-by-incident discretion of
police in dealing with calls for service. Manning finds that even though
the communications technologies of the two departments differ, managers and supervisors in both pay more attention to the internal logic of
their systems than the ability of these systems to make useful representations of environmental complexity. By focusing on what the technology
does well (e.g., rapid transmission and recording of coded information)
and leaving virtually unmonitored the key boundary-spanning decisions
of street-level personnel (e.g., crime classification decisions), these organizations have constructed "mock bureaucracies," that bear little relationship to the realities of policing. Given Western police departments'
infatuation with technological solutions to problems, it would be interesting to apply this form of analysis to other recent innovations, such as
computer-based performance analysis and planning.
Two chapters do a great deal to deflate the widely accepted wisdom
that secrecy and loyalty cement police officers into a solid police culture.
In Amsterdam and New York City, senior officials were found to be at
odds with the rank and file. The schism surfaced in a corruption scandal in Amsterdam and was manifested in line officers' responses to the
development of a scientific management ethos among police administrators in New York. Those who have advocated the dismantling of the
"monolithic" police culture as crucial to the enlargement of police accountability will not find these studies reassuring, for they conclude that
the fragmentation of police culture not only magnifies the organization's
internal stress, but also produces two warring factions, neither of which
can give positive direction to the organization.
Michael R. Chatterton's analysis of British arrest practices in assault cases shows that simple interpretations of occupational culture fail
to produce a complete explanation of the officers' use of arrest powers.
His study shows the key role played by the interaction of an officer's
working philosophy (style) with his skill in manipulating available resources to achieve the desired outcome for his style (competency). The
severity of charges filed depends upon the subtleties of circumstance
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which often bear no relationship to the law and are inaccessible to those
inclined to analyze arrest statistics. This excellent essay joins a growing
literature that points out the difficulty of interpreting official data without understanding the social processes that created them.
John Van Maanen examines the extent to which first-line supervisors contribute to the control of police work. In a lucid and vivid analysis, he maps the contours of the police sergeant's power and
vulnerability. The sergeant's concentration on procedural minutia belies his or her substantive influence. That this influence is too frequently
exercised in ways that render only the appearance of legality and workmanship (as in arrest reports and activity "stats") reflects on the inability of top management to forge stronger bonds with sergeants. To the
extent that managers are able to secure sergeants' commitment to managerial norms, they may reduce their sergeants' capacity to govern. Although Van Maanen does not appear sanguine about the prospects of
forging these links, his research indicates a few opportunities for managers to harness their sergeants' potential.
Two contributors, both with extensive experience in quantitative
evaluation and experimental design, derive modest policy implications
from their research. Lawrence Sherman finds that it is possible to use
public criticism generated by "critical events" to unfreeze undesirable
policies and practices, such as excessive police gun use, provided that
administrators are willing to seize these opportunities and pursue reform
with determination. Sherman is rightfully cautious in assessing the extent to which critical events can yield organizational change. For example, the urban cataclysms of the 1960's appear to have generated little
real reform at the street level of police work. George L. Kelling's review
of police accomplishments leads him to a similar judgment for police
patrol reform. Despite his skepticism of police ability to overcome resistance to innovation and to reduce crime, Kelling finds a silver lining in
the pessimism of the previous decade's evaluative research. He argues
that absent satisfactory demonstrations of police capacity to reduce
crime, police should focus their efforts where they have demonstrated a
capacity: reducing fear of crime and improving police-community relations. Kelling's are among the strongest policy assertions in the book,
and while this reviewer finds them appealing, a whole-hearted endorsement of this new direction is premature. First, the sole foot patrol experiment by which his assertions of police effectiveness hang is a slender
thread indeed. Second, one would expect greater skepticism about the
value of a police force that judges its performance according to its ability to manipulate the public's fear of crime. If fear of crime were to
assume the central role that crime rates now serve in directing the police
mission, what assurance do we have that the same organizational
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pathologies that distort the crime control process would not influence
attempts to reduce fear of crime? Finally, we need to question the limits
to which governments may go in manipulating the appearance of public
safety if research tells us that it bears little relationship to the reality. A
little-or a lot-of anxiety about crime may be very functional under
certain circumstances.
The essays in the "comparative perspective" section of the book
deal with macro-level developments of policing in Western Europe, particularly in the Netherlands. The contribution of these chapters to the
literature on control of police is secondary to the exposure they give to
policing outside the United States.
In a treatise distinct from all others in the volume, Albert Reiss, Jr.,
reflects on how organizations are policed. Some circumstances call for
deterrence strategies (designed to punish offenders); others call for compliance strategies (designed to gain obedience without punishment).
Compliance strategies are usually employed where organizational violations have high costs for society, and detection and punishment are complex or protracted. As more organizational life assumes this quality,
Reiss believes that private security systems will appropriate a larger
share of the responsibility for organizational enforcement. Ironically, the
criterion that Bittner finds so inadequate for producing an accountable
police force-compliance with the law-is the very standard which
Reiss expects will eventually dominate the control strategies applied to
other organizations.
The book makes no pretensions to comprehensiveness, but three
omissions are regrettable. The first is an in-depth consideration of the
extent to which the quantity and quality of control of police organizations has changed throughout history. The second is an empirical evaluation of the role played by the institutions formally assigned to govern
police (e.g., mayors, local legislators, and city managers). The current
wisdom is that these officials have abdicated their responsibility to govern, but a systematic test of this hypothesis is lacking-except in the
most ungovernable of cities. This may not be the case in suburban,
small town, and rural areas. Third, it would be useful for the development of a more general control theory to have a sense of how controlled
police are, compared to other public and private human service industries-education, health, and welfare.
The volume will be of principal interest to police researchers and
scholars, although administrators willing to wade through occasional,
but dense, thickets of social science dialect will find their efforts rewarded. Many of the empirica*, pieces, particularly those by Chatterton
and Van Maanen, are suitable for undergraduates and are likely to become "classics" in their areas. In addition to the strengths of the indi-
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vidual contributions, the work taken as a whole displays a coherence all
too rare in edited collections. The authors' topics and approaches vary
greatly, but the editor's organization and prefatory comments minimize

the discontinuity among works. The major criticism offered-that more
is needed-A"s inevitable with a topic of this scope at this exploratory
juncture.
STEPHEN MASTROFSKI
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

THE HOME FRONT: NOTES FROM THE FAMILY WAR ZONE.

By Louse

Armstrong. New York: McGraw Hill, 1983. Pp. xi, 252. $14.95.
Armstrong's The Home Front.-Notesfrom the Family War Zone presents
a different perspective on the important problem of family violence.
This book may be most appropriate for the newcomer to the field of
battered women and sexually abused and battered children. Early in
the book, Armstrong raises the issue of why behavior which would be
considered "against the law" if committed outside of the family home is
described as "only a domestic disturbance," or is dismissed by saying
"children have great fantasies," since no "normal" parent would do
such a thing. She writes from the perspective of one filling the need for

enlightening the unenlightened. If the reader has little experience or
knowledge in the area of family violence, then this book would be informative and a good addition to one's library. It is easy to read, and it
would be appropriate as a supplemental text in a course examining family violence.
The Home Front is concerned with the abuse that occurs in the family setting, perpetrated by men against their wives and/or their children.
Many pages are devoted to child sexual abuse and the dilemma of the
mother who, while unable to find support from "the system" to stop the
abuse, is made to feel guilty for her husband's transgressions, both
against their children and against herself. Armstrong also focuses on
society's legitimization of abuse toward women and children while examining the role of state intervention in extricating a child from an
abusing home. At the same time she discusses the major reasons why
the perpetrator's sexual assault and physical abuse in the family home is
not treated as criminal behavior.
Using the case study method, Armstrong critically examines responses to the recent discovery of family violence, and uses the same
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method to critique Freud's discussion of children who fantasize about
sexual encounters with their parents. Finally, Armstrong pointedly
notes that the accepted social norms of parenting in Freud's time were
actually quite abusive toward children.
An underlying thesis throughout the book is the two-sided dilemma
in which women seem to find themselves. Armstrong argues that women are blamed both for their being battered by their husbands and for
the husband's molesting of their children. She identifies the problem as
a failure to hold men accountable for female or child battering. She
argues that the breakdown of the family is viewed by society as due to
women's failure to do their "duty to society" as the "saviors of men."
She further documents the political concept of using women to restrain
individual men from their baser instincts, and she argues that women
are actually kept on a political leash by a society which urges them to
higher commitment to the family. She then concludes that male household violence is generally viewed as a natural cost of purchasing social
tranquility.
Armstrong spends several chapters discussing, both from an historical and a current perspective, problems of state intervention in family
violence which she views as "therapeutic" use of authority by the state.
Again adopting the case study method of Parnham v. J.R. andj.L. ,I she
discusses state abuse of children by placing them in mental hospitals,
juvenile halls, and orphanages in the absence of a demonstrated problem other than that the family simply did not want them.
Armstrong conludes by arguing that each individual has a right to
equal protection under the law; she succinctly suggests that what is
needed is the protection of the person and rights of the individual,
rather than the protection of "family harmony."
In attempting to cover both child sexual abuse and wife battering
in a single volume, Armstrong may well have diluted the importance of
what she is saying. This reviewer is familiar with the extensive literature
in this area and yet found the book confusing in its many transitions
between sexual abuse and wife battering. Peculiarly, Armstrong criticizes state intervention to stop the sexual abuse of children while at the
same time indicts the state for not intervening in wife abuse cases. She
seems to want "due process" in the family, apparently not realizing that
due process is itself a contributor to the adversarial position, which further increases the likelihood of not recognizing problems in the family.
No alternatives were suggested as possible solutions to this important
problem, a disappointing omission. Perhaps a major reason for this
omission is the narrowness of the sample, which seems to have centered
I Parnham v. J.R. and J.L., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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in New York. This reviewer is not convinced that Armstrong did not
come to her conclusions prior to the selection of her data.
ANNA F. KUHL
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY

By Gwynn Nettler. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1982. Pp. 364. $15.95.

KILLING ONE ANOTHER.

Studies of homicide tend to focus on either the legal consequences
of the act, or the offender's proclivities, rather than on the act itself.
Nettler draws upon diverse studies to investigate the homicidal act by
identifying what he believes are the causes or conditions that lead to
homicide at both the aggregate and individual levels.
In attempting to identify why acts of homicide are not universally
deplored, Nettler describes some of the obvious moral dilemmas faced
by those who would argue for a universal definition. As he points out,
definitions of homicide are saturated with ideas of appropriate and inappropriate moral behavior, permitting styles of deadly quarrels to be
identified without allowing them to be adequately classified. The definitional breakdown occurs because homicide is the result of contingencies; these contingencies may be defined as the lack of training in
inhibition, or training to value moral codes that indoctrinate violence.
Killing, then, may be ascribed to the desire for money and power,
disinhibiting influences, and culturally proscribed behavior. While
these reasons are the prime motivators, they are not the only reasons
why people kill. There are disinhibitors which permit the relaxing of
control. Nettler mentions several categories of environmental disinhibitors-frustration, relative deprivation, the notion of entitlement, relativism and nihilism, useless youth, fragmented families, residential and
occupational mobility, and comforting chemicals-but ignores many
situational factors that can facilitate or impede deadly action. For example, Luckenbill and Sanders,' Toch, 2 and Wolfgang 3 found that the
victim's behavior plays an important role in facilitating or impeding violent behavior. Similarily, Bard 4 found that the presence of bystanders
1 Luckenbill & Sanders, Criminal Violence, in DEVIANTS: VOLUNTARY ACTORS IN A HosTILE WORLD (E. Sagarin & F. Montanino eds. 1977).
2 H. TOCH, VIOLENT MEN (1969).
3

M.

WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE (1958).

4 Bard, The Study andModifcalion of ntra-FamilialViolence, in THE CONTROL OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: COGNITIVE AND PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS (J. Singer ed. 1971).
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can escalate a confrontation, as can the presence of a weapon, as noted
6
5
by Wolfgang and Berkowitz.
Nettler lists eight major routes to homicide. These include self-defense, love, lust, lunacy, psychopathy, wealth and power, and terrorism.
Taxonomies of murderers by Jesse, 7 Guttmacher, s Glasser and others9
show that these routes to homicide have long been recognized. But regardless of whether routes to homicide are identified, or taxonomies developed, we still do not know whether or not various murderers differ
with regard to their etiology or personal dynamics, nor do we know the
true extent to which disinhibitors contribute to acts of homicide.
Terrorism, as an occasion for homicide, is artificially separated out
by Nettler for special treatment. Hacker classifies terrorists as criminals,
crazies, or crusaders. Criminals, he believes, are motivated primarily by
the desire for material gain. Crusaders, on the other hand, are rebels
with a cause. Crazies merely act out their mental aberrations.' 0 Based
on this typology terrorism could have been discussed in the chapters on
wealth and power, lunacy, and psychopathy.
Unlike others, Nettler defines terrorism as "the conscious use of cruelty and killing to spread fear through a population as an instrument of
power" (p. 226). Most definitions of terrorism avoid the use of term
"cruelty" and recognize the fact that terrorism is a political act and as
such has a political goal. Nettler's definition seems to be aimed at governments rather than individuals or groups.
The central theme of Killing One Another is that moral philosophies
are prime determinants of behavior. Kohlberg and others have attempted to assess the effect of moral thought development on attitudes
toward law and legal justice, but few criminologists have displayed
much interest in this area.'l It is to Nettler's credit that he addresses the
importance of moral development in identifying the routes to homicide.
The book succeeds as a description of homicide. The descriptions
are both general and specific, and employ secondary sources that allow
the reader to focus on reasons or occasions for killing. The text is well5 M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3.
6 Berkowitz, Impulse, Aggression and the Gun, 2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 18 (1968).
7

F. JESSE,

8 M.

9 D.

MURDER AND ITS MOTIVES (1952).

GUTTMACHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER
GLASSER,

D.

KENEFICK & V.

(1960).

O'LEARY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND

DEVELOPMENT, VIOLENT OFFENDER (1968).
10 F. HACKER, CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAZIES: TERROR AND TERRORISM IN OUR

TIME (1976).

11 See Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproach to Socialization, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH (D. Gosling ed. 1969); L. Kohlberg,

The Development of Modes in Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10-16 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago).
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written and the cases provided are timely and interesting. The author
displays an extensive familiarity with the subject matter and the work
represents a skillful integration of materials.
There is little doubt as to where Nettler stands on the issues discussed; his subjectivity and biases are evident throughout the book. His
treatment of the materials, however, is generally well balanced and his
personal opinions are usually held until the end of each section where
they do not detract from the text.
This book provides the reader with a basic descriptive introduction
to reasons for or occasions of homicide, and as such would be of considerable value to the novice. In this respect, it fills a significant gap in the
literature and should prove to be both interesting and informative to
readers desiring a convenient compilation of reasons for homicide. An
extensive bibliography is provided and should prove useful for those desiring to pursue a more in-depth treatment of the topic.
PHYLLIS M. KISOR
HARRIS COUNTY JUVENILE
PROBATION DEPARTMENT

HOUSTON, TEXAS

CONTROLLING THE OFFENDER IN THE COMMUNITY.

By Todd R. Clear

and Vincent O'Leag. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1983. Pp.
xvii, 189. $29.95.
This volume is a worthwhile contribution to the field of risk prediction and offender control through community supervision. While this is
a rather narrow topic, the authors have successfully integrated it into
the broader areas of corrections and, more generally, punishment. It is
difficult to say that this book fills a void in the literature, for there is
relatively little scholarly interest in the risk posed by offenders in the
community. Nonetheless, the authors have done a good job in assessing
this topic.
The authors state that their "fundamental aim is to develop a fair
system of community protection in which incapacitative and treatment
measures designed to control risk are employed rationally" (p. 27). In
this work, they seek to develop guidelines which balance the traditional
concern for community protection with offender needs. This is to be
accomplished within a "just deserts" framework. This topic is treated
with a good deal more sophistication than is usually the case. The complexities of risk control are dealt with in a manner that pays particular
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attention to the interrelated nature of the processes of classification, interaction, and management. A particular strength of Controlling the Offender in the Communit is the attention given to line-level and managerial
tasks, as well as the interaction between the two.
The authors have targeted this book at practitioners as well as those
who study the field of community supervision of offenders. Thus, the
book emphasizes practical considerations such as implementation, classification, and management, in a framework professionals involved in the
field would find valuable. For this reason, those in academia may find
the book of little utility. The authors adequately confront these issues,
though in a fashion that is valuable primarily to those faced with the
day-to-day task of community supervision.
The primary goal of the authors in writing the book was to effect
change in community criminal justice systems. They seek to do this in a
context that is sensitive to a three-pronged emphasis on 1) controlling
the social control net, 2) guaranteeing due process, and 3) sustaining the
capacity for change. Clear and O'Leary suggest that sensitivity to these
three principles can prevent the negative consequences often associated
with change. Although these concerns are clearly expressed early in the
book, the authors fail to integrate them sufficiently into later chapters. A
further shortcoming of the book lies in its emphasis on risk. The concern
for risk is not adequately balanced against its opposing concern, reintegration. Arguably, Clear and O'Leary's book is guilty of an overemphasis on control and inadequate concern for the welfare of the offender.
The book is written and organized in a clear and straightforward
manner. Concepts are well-defined and logically interrelated. This is
particularly true of the author's core concept of risk control. The book
presents a series of cases that make the concepts presented clearer and
more valuable. The material is organized in such a fashion that those
marginally knowledgeable about community corrections can readily follow its presentation.
One of the more difficult tasks for academicians is to provide scholarly analysis of programs that can be readily implemented in actual settings. Clear and O'Leary have done an excellent job in this regard.
While the book will be of interest to a limited readership, those involved
in community supervision will welcome this as a valuable addition to
the literature of the field.
SCOTT H.

DECKER,

PH.D.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. Louis
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1606-1660. By Bradley ChaThe University of Georgia Press, 1983. Pp. 203.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA,

pin. Athens:
$18.00.

Although the corpus of American legal and criminal justice historiography has expanded in recent years, significant gaps in our knowledge
of the origin, development, and impact of agencies of social control remain. The operation of the colonial criminal justice system, in particular, remains enigmatic. Bradley Chapin's CriminalJustice in Colonial
America, 1606-1660 attempts to fill this intellectual void by exposing
"the lost world of early American law." More specifically, Chapin analyzes the origins of colonial substantive and procedural law, the development of unique court structures, and the nature and extent of crime in
specific jurisdictions. Primary emphasis is placed upon exploring the
English roots of colonial reform and assessing the explanatory power of
"reception theory"-that is, the notion that the colonial criminal justice
system was a simplistic, arbitrary, and even crude modification of English law and methods of control.
A sophisticated, cross-cultural analysis linking the differential development of legal systems in specific colonies-Virginia, Plymouth,
Massachusetts Bay, Maryland, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Haven-with English judicial roots is employed to achieve this end. Chapin's analysis of colonial criminal justice systems is grounded in an
analysis of extant primary sources-legislative and judicial records,
commentaries, manuals, law texts, pamphlets, and tracts-as well as in
other miscellaneous documents and secondary sources. The development of each colony's criminal justice system is interpreted within the
context of its social structure.
Chapin's thesis is unequivocal: colonial criminal justice systems
were not simplistic, crude adaptations of British criminal law, as reception theory posits. Each colony adapted English law to fit unique economic, political, cultural, religious, demographic, and social conditions.
Virginia's criminal justice system reflected its founders' aim of creating
''a contemporary English agrarian society"; New England colonies (with
the exception of Rhode Island) developed a system of justice which
would reflect a God-fearing "Israelite society." Chapin concludes that
colonial innovations were generally rational, intelligent reforms which
humanized and simplified English criminal law. In essence, colonists,
unencumbered by an entrenched political system, factional politics, and
professional lawyers, were able to implement progressive change before
English legal reformers. Thus, the settlers merely "carried" English law
into the New World.
Chapin's analysis of colonial substantive and procedural law (chap-
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ters one and two) and court structure (chapter three) substantiates this
thesis. A content analysis of twenty-nine colonial laws reveals that New
World substantive law generally followed English precedent (57%), but
that much of the law had indigenous (25%) or Biblical (18%) origins.
The colonists modeled English practice in formulating crimes against
persons, and used Biblical and ecclesiastical precedents in shaping sex
offenses, but colonial property offenses were grounded on indigenous
and less sanguinary (e.g., theft was not a capital offense) philosophies.
The colonists also eclectically transported the functional aspects of English procedural law-e.g., the right to reasonable bail, to a speedy trial,
to confront accusers, and to know charges-but abandoned benefit of
clergy and attainder leading to property forfeiture and corruption of the
blood. As compared to the English experience, Chapin concludes that
colonial procedural law moved in the "direction of fairness." The most
obvious examples of this trend, however, were colonial reforms in court
structure. Colonists replaced the cumbersome Kings Bench and courts
of assize, quarter sessions, and leet with structures suited to each jurisdiction's philosophical orientation and social structure. The result, concludes Chapin, was a simplified and rational system of justice.
Chapin's analysis of colonial crime (chapter four) is also informative. Analyses of court records and other sources reveal that crime was
not a serious problem and recidivism was "virtually nil." The small size
of colonial villages, close family ties, low unemployment, the scarcity of
material goods, and a variety of other factors combined to create an
environment not conducive to theft, homicide, robbery, and other serious offenses. Colonists did, however, make a concerted effort to control
sex-related offenses (fornication, adultery, bestiality, sodomy, lesbianism) and misconduct (sabbath violations, drinking and tobacco use, profanity, apostasy, gambling). Perceptions of "deviance" and "dangerous
groups" also varied significantly by colony: Puritan oligarchs in Massachusetts and the Calverts of Maryland were concerned with seditious
behavior while those governing Virginia were concerned with labor discipline, idleness, and the maintenance of tobacco profits. Colonial
courts, then, primarily heard civil suits, probate matters, and problems
related to public administration.
This study does, however, suffer from a number of theoretical,
methodological, and analytical limitations. The scope of the work, in
places, seems too broad; can a comparative study of seven legal systems
covering a fifty-six year period be completed in 149 pages? Morever,
Chapin's interpretations sometimes lack depth. He concludes, for example, that legal developments in a number of colonies were shaped by
economic considerations but does not pursue the linkage between material conditions and methods of social control. His analysis might have
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been made more penetrating if he had adopted a social rather than a
legal historiographic orientation. Chapin's discussion of colonial crime
is, however, particularly susceptible to criticism. The author's disclaimers and caveats about the weaknesses of his data are well-placed; systems
processing data should not, however, be used to measure "crime," irrespective of its accuracy. Chapin sits on the proverbial "limb" by using
the same data to conclude that recidivism rates were "virtually nil."
Despite these limitations, Chapin's Criminal Justice in Colonial
America, 1606-1660 is a significant contribution to the literature. Legal
historians should profit from descriptions of colonial criminal justice systems, interpretations of their unique origins, the identification of primary data sources, and the study's comparative, cross-cultural
methodology. Nonlegally-oriented readers may gain a better sense of
the roots of America's seemingly archaic criminal justice system, a system which was once a logical response to unique social conditions and
which served the needs of its time.
ALEXANDER W. PISCIOTTA, PH.D.
KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

